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Introduction 
This paper largely concerns grounding concepts that inform medical and 
social theories of impairment. It discusses impairment in relation to 
normal function, including its identification as deviation from normal 
health. It then draws upon phenomenological concepts to develop an 
alternate account of embodiment, as always already dependent upon 
relations with things outside itself. It posits that ‘normal ability’ is 
consequently a socio-historical elaboration rather than an objectively 
existing state of aﬀairs, and that the accompanying prioritisation of some 
modes of embodiment over others creates the phenomenon called 
disability. Finally, it outlines an alternative framework that eschews 
reference to transcendent norms for grounding in capacities and goals, 
however atypical, of embodied agents. 
1.1. Medical and Social Theories of Disability and Impairment 
The meaning of disability is commonly take as settled. It is a personal 
problem occasioned by a dysfunctional body or property thereof. This 
‘medical model’ broadly asserts the following (by degrees). (1) Identity 
obtains between disability and abnormal individual morphology. (2) This 
morphology fails to realise normal human function. (3) Disabilities 
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directly cause negative outcomes or health decrements. (4) Consequently, 
disabilities warrant correction or rehabilitation, which the disabled person 
should aﬃrm. 
Consider Christopher Boorse’s influential species typical function.1 
Here health equals conformity with species typical function. This is 
specified as statistically normal function or design of some ‘reference class’ 
(species members of similar age and sex). For Boorse, “the normal is the 
natural”: natural equals species typical design. Normalcy is an objective 
biological fact, verified statistically for a particular class. This ‘empirical 
ideal’ grounds health judgements. Health is conformity with this ideal; 
disease deviates from it. Impairment, as deviation from normal function, 
is pathological, and so is essentially a reduction of health. 
Theorists advancing a ‘social model of disability’ dispute that 
impairment is the preeminent cause of many limitations. Medical 
definitions do not merely report natural states of aﬀairs, but also ascribe 
negative meanings to impairments, that acquire the status of “objective 
fact and common sense”.2 They criticise the medical model for considering 
disability largely objective, knowable and constant, overlooking not only 
how properties change, but how experience thereof varies by culture or 
environment. Minimal attention is paid to other life-aﬀecting 
circumstances. They suggest that the medical framework itself produces 
deleterious outcomes. Its pervasive influence may engender a “fallacy of 
composition… where a false conclusion is drawn about the whole person 
                                               
 1  Christopher Boorse, "A Second Rebuttal on Health", The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
39, no. 6 (2014); "Health As a Theoretical Concept", Philosophy of Science 44, no. 4 (1977): 
542-573; "A Rebuttal on Health," in What Is Disease?, ed. J.M. Humber and R.F. Almeder 
(Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1997). 
 2  Alison Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2013), 5. In relation to the medical model, it matters less by whom it is applied, 
more that disability is thought a ‘medical problem’. 
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based on features of her constituent parts”.3 That disability is considered 
individual, a “personal tragedy” to be “treated, prevented or cured”, 
renders disabled people fundamentally unlike, even lesser then, a 
nondisabled majority.4 Removing disadvantage means overcoming 
disability through cure or personal fortitude. Social participation 
correlates to approximation of normalcy.5 Finally, where disability is 
considered the foremost or total cause of disadvantage, other causes are 
occluded and alternate responses precluded. 
 Social modellists reject that disability is immanent to the body. They 
disambiguate causes into two kinds—biological and social—with 
corresponding outcomes. Impairment describes mere objective 
morphological facts, and attendant limitations. Disability describes 
socially-instantiated discrimination flowing from negative evaluations 
about impairment; evaluations based in hierarchical divisions between 
normalcy and deviance whose origin is at least partially medical. 
Impairment becomes disability on meeting discrimination or an 
unsupportive environment. Impairment means one cannot walk. 
Disability occurs where buildings are inaccessible. 
1.2. Some Problems of the Social Model 
The social model is laudable for disclosing aspects of disability not entailed 
by impairment. Yet certain aspects warrant criticism: chiefly, the 
impairment/disability distinction. This objectifies the body as a brute 
thing separate from and prior to social experience. First, this upholds 
persistent dualisms that render the body inert, atemporal and ahistorical: 
                                               
 3  Steven R. Smith, "Social Justice and Disability: Competing Interpretations of the Medical 
and Social Models," in Arguing About Disability: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Kristjana 
Kristiansen, Simo Vehmas and Tom Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 2009), 20-1. 
 4  Michael Oliver and Colin Barnes, The New Politics of Disablement (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 20. 
 5  Or in extreme cases, elimination of the pathological individual. 
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either a clump of inert stuﬀ or mechanistically produced. It is reduced to 
what phenomenology calls an objective body:6 “devoid of meaning, a 
dysfunctional, anatomical, corporeal mass obdurate in its resistance to 
signification and phenomenologically dead, without intentionality or 
agency”.7 Lived or agential aspects are transferred to separate social or 
mental domains. 
Second, while disabling social responses to impairment are criticised, 
the category itself remains unaddressed. Social modellists claim that the 
medical model falsely overestimates limitations flowing from impairment 
properties, and rejoins that some, though not all, are spurious. This 
maintains, and also naturalises, the existing bifurcation into normal and 
abnormal embodiment. Impairment remains a problematic deviation 
outside the normal scope of embodiment. Interestingly, Boorse considers 
his work compatible with disability theory that admits impairment’s 
objective pathology, while well-known disability theorist Tom 
Shakespeare aﬃrms Boorse’s disease concept.8 For medicine and social 
model alike impairment equals natural abnormality. Relatedly, this 
impedes recognition that impairment’s provenance may itself be partially 
socio-historical and evaluative. This is apparent in contestations over 
definition: entities designated impairments vary by time and place. More 
profound still are Susan Wendell’s questions, which inform what follows: 
how far must one walk to be non-impaired? Do contextual variations not 
contribute?9 
                                               
 6  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald Landes (London: 
Routledge, 2012). 
 7  Bill Hughes and Kevin Paterson, "The Social Model of Disability and the Disappearing 
Body: Towards a Sociology of Impairment", Disability & Society 12, no. 3 (1997): 325-340. 
 8  Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited (London: Routledge, 2014). 
 9  Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (London: 
Routledge, 1996). 
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2.1. Merleau-Ponty and Active Perception 
It bears consideration whether strict division between normalcy and 
impairment is tenable, and whether the body is separate from social 
experience. Accordingly, I will outline a phenomenologically informed 
account of embodied subjectivity, before addressing the salience of 
technicity. An enduring story about human experience supposes that 
perception and action serve knowledge; and, that objective body serves 
subjective mind, which is the locus of consciousness and knowledge.10 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology rejects such definitive 
distinction between consciousness and embodiment. For him the body is 
no inert ventriloquist’s dummy requiring animation. It is an ‘organ’ of 
movement and connection, one’s very openness to the world. As 
embodied and having a particular perceptual structure, and as immersed 
within the world, it necessarily and immediately has a perspective or 
comportment. Its world is prereflectively encountered as meaningful 
situations, structured by past and present interests, and eliciting response. 
Accordingly, the world appears not as Cartesian extensa wherein objects 
are disinterestedly arrayed and await meaning, but as already charged with 
sense.11 Likewise, the body is not typically experienced as an object, 
however intimate, but a power of acting towards situations.12 One does 
not have, but is, a body that is a “knot of living significations”.13 So, in 
familiar activity, body and world are not given as discrete terms—subject 
standing over against object—but as prereflective involvement in proximal 
activity. Knowledge serves activity. Indeed, perception is a kind of 
                                               
 10  This is consistent with what Susan Hurley calls the ‘traditional sandwich model’ of mind 
and body. The body inputs sensation; then the ‘heavy lifting’ occurs within the brain qua 
mind as this is organised into knowledge via representation; then finally, this is returned to 
the world as bodily action. Susan Hurley, "The Varieties of Externalism," in The Extended 
Mind, ed. Richard Menary (London: MIT Press, 2010). 
 11  By ‘sense’ is meant something like the French sens: at once meaning, and direction. 
 12  Donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013). 
 13  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 153. 
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incipient action: to grasp the world is to prepare action in response to its 
solicitations. Consequently, the embodied self is not a substantive. 
Wherever encountered, it is always disposed, in motion, which is 
inauguration of sense. 
2.2. Sociality and Technicity 
I have so far suggested that the body’s ‘essence’ is to act towards situational 
possibilities, which concurrently inaugurates sense. This can be further 
developed. The human is traditionally considered bounded, self-identical 
and enduring, with determinate functions that exist in advance of 
activities. It is possible to propose a diﬀerent ontology of human 
embodiment: both existing or constituting itself as its activities, and 
‘always already enhanced’ through profound incorporation within such 
activity of extra-organismic materials. Various philosophers call this 
condition ‘originary technicity’. Technics refers less to technological 
objects, and more to a constitutive relation of embodied activity with 
things outside it. This implies that the being of the human is constituted 
through creative engagement with things, but that its realisation likewise 
relies upon such relations. 
Two interconnected phenomenological aspects are salient: experiential, 
and developmental. First, myriad prostheses, broadly construed, are 
incorporated within activities more usually limited to mind and body. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the lived body does not terminate at the dermal 
boundary.14 He considers the visually impaired man whose integration of 
cane and bodily intentionality becomes suﬃciently profound to 
incorporate this within perceptual integrity, as he negotiates situational 
space. It is no longer an external mediating object, but one “sensitive zone” 
                                               
 14  As Gallagher and Zahavi put it, “the lived body extends beyond the limits of the biological 
body”. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind (London: Routledge, 
2013), 138. 
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among multiple ‘organs’ that together give him his world. Likewise, 
experienced wheelchair-users traverse space using sensorimotor 
knowledge that is ‘of them’, and where chair is within this “global 
awareness of… posture in the inter-sensory world”.15 This is possible due 
to involvement within world-directed projects. Not only do thought and 
action overspill embodiment. They emerge from, and supervene upon, 
processual interactions between brain, body and world: they are enacted in 
“dynamic interactions between organisms and environments”.16 For 
Shaun Gallagher, mind is no container for propositional attitudes, but a 
(crucial) participant in a web of dynamic problem-solving procedures 
enacted through “dialectical, transformative relations with the 
environment”.17 
Second, prosthetics are profoundly interwoven within human 
development. For Joanna Zylinska the human is “always already 
prosthetic, whereby relationality and dependence on ‘the outside’ are the 
condition of emergence and existence in the world”.18 This tendency to 
self-exteriorisation, composition and assemblage suggests radical bodily 
openness. Humans do not merely interact with external things, while 
remaining essentially unchanged: in transforming technology they are 
transformed. A fundamental aspect of human being-in-the-world has 
been, and continues to be, meaningful and active negotiation of human-
nonhuman boundaries. The history of hominisation is one of co-evolution 
                                               
 15  Ibid., 102. Such insights are augmented by Bach-y-Rita’s study of prosthetic tactile-visual 
substitution system use by visually-impaired people. Visual stimuli from a head-mounted 
camera is referred to a vibrotactile activator array, producing a ‘tactile image’ on the 
subject’s back. With time subjects report three-dimensional spatial experience of objects 
and object-relations, and can enact spontaneous spatial negotiation (including grasping), 
despite never having seen. Paul Bach-y-Rita et al, "Vision Substitution by Tactile Image 
Projection", Nature 221, no. 5184 (1969): 963-4.  
 16  John Protevi, Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences (London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2014), 127. 
 17  Shaun Gallagher, "The Socially Extended Mind", Cognitive Systems Research 25-26 (2013). 
 18  Joanna Zylinska, "Playing God, Playing Adam: The Politics and Ethics of Enhancement", 
Bioethical Inquiry 7, no. 2 (2010). 
8 
with tools and prosthetics:19 “a long line of technical prostheses such as 
flint stones and other ‘memory devices’ that have played an active role in 
the very process of the constitution of the human”.20 This constitution 
remains essentially incomplete. 
All bodies are mixed. The subject is not self-identical but produced 
through its associations. This has implications for biological-social 
relations. Recall the phenomenological insight that milieus are disclosed 
not only according to morphology, but also accumulated experience 
expressed as habit or comportment. So, worldly possibilities are disclosed 
as an indivisible compound with organismic and social aspects. There is 
no pure organism separate from social and technical relations, since 
comportment is enabled and acquired within a world of already 
meaningful, historically elaborating assemblages.21  
2.3. A Biosocial Account of Impairment 
I now consider implications for impairment. This concerns its supposed 
natural dysfunction, rather than socially instantiated disability. My point 
is that impairment is no more natural than disability. Impaired arises from 
historically elaborated disvalue attached to atypical morphology. 
First, contexts delimit in advance which activities are available, and thus 
which have been assigned value. While a certain body may be unable to 
realise activities in a given milieu, many purportedly spontaneous and 
natural objectives and situations are contingent outcomes of the 
aforementioned harmonisation of bodies and space, that has prioritised a 
                                               
 19  Andre ́ Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, trans. Anna Bostock Berger (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). 
 20  Zylinska, "Playing God, Playing Adam", 157. 
 21  Indeed, in many cases interactions modify neural and physical makeup. Clark suggests that 
body and brain have developed as they have precisely because of this primordial activity 
that tends towards connection and formation of coupled systems. Andy Clark, Supersizing 
the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
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delimited range of morphologies. This grants to typical bodies their 
apparent natural function. Yet since situations and activities are produced 
and contingent, so are associated functional norms. There is no essential 
human function that transcends contexts. Context-transcendent ability 
would imply some kind of originary, self-suﬃcient, complete human, as 
though in the state of nature. As Bernard Stiegler writes, this condition 
represents “the absence of relation”.22 There is no universally valid—that 
is, ‘normal’—mode, but normalised relations that prioritise certain modes. 
Put diﬀerently, ‘ability’ is not preexistent but realised in situational 
activity.23 This makes occurrence not merely spatial but temporal. 
Disability and ability exist as they happen, according to the activity at 
hand and norms concerning valued activity. There is no ability or disability 
antecedent of situation, only enabling and disabling relations. ‘Ability’ is 
less a matter of innate features, and more of temporally-normalised 
relations between bodies and a world of ‘assistive devices’ that en-able 
them. The seeming complementarity between ‘normal’ humans and 
environments is not spontaneous, but the outcome of activities, both 
historical and contemporary, that render the world thus according to a 
privileged corporeal ideal. Conversely, disability qua impairment is neither 
reducible to physical properties, nor inherent lack.24 It occurs where 
supports are absent, or ill-fitting for merely atypical bodies: where an 
orientated body encounters others with incongruent orientations, or 
spaces with inapt aﬀordances. The ’normal body’ it is implicitly given at 
                                               
 22  Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 128. 
 23  No convenient opposite exists for impairment, and I will discuss ‘ability’ in a fairly general 
sense. Hence I use disability and ability here in a loose sense of ‘(not) being able to do 
things’, where this is not caused by bodily properties but relations with milieus. 
 24  For this reason, I consider impairment merely a medical term with limited applicability, 
and do not consider impairment qua objective abnormality part of the furniture of the 
universe. Henceforth I will use anomalous embodiment to denote mere atypicality, and 
disability to describe limiting situations based in assumptions that impairments are 
objectively real. 
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one pole of the body-world circuit, instantiated within milieus of various 
kinds. One attempts ‘normal’ possibilities because these are habitually 
given as ‘what everyone does’, and because contexts advert to such 
aﬀordances. So, environments solicit unrealisable possibilities: however 
eﬀectively the non-visual person or wheelchair-user comports themselves, 
they inhabit an environment designed for motility other than theirs. 
Though partially instantiated in architecture, cultural products, policy 
prescriptions, and so on, disability is relational: it is only activated to the 
extent that these encounter bodies. In this biosocial notion of humanity, 
categorisations are non-trivial, and aﬀect distribution of resources for 
activity. Thus, some enjoy aﬀordances while others are denied. It is not 
intrinsic to an atypical body that it cannot act in a milieu; a historically 
elaborated milieu only accommodates typical bodies. This does not deny 
that ability has degrees, only that it is specifiable independent of context 
and activity. And, it may be enacted diﬀerently—aided, or inhibited—by 
diﬀerent environments. 
3.1. The Problem of Limits: Impairment and The Human 
So, the development of the human has centrally involved production and 
negotiation of limits, including boundaries between itself and what lies 
outside it, where this outside has also involved anomalous embodiment. 
Some such limits are materially embedded: genetic endowments 
(prioritisation of certain genotypes during prenatal testing), or spatial 
organisation (inaccessible architecture). Others are epistemic: ways of 
seeing, thinking and acting incarnated as habit or “maintained in textual, 
technological, institutional procedures or cultural practices”.25 They might 
                                               
 25  Gallagher, "The Socially Extended Mind", 7. This is only a diﬀerence in principle, a false 
dichotomy. Material space aﬀects how behaviour is enacted; likewise habits of thought 
aﬀect which genetic endowments are transmitted, and ways of acting modify spatial 
organisation. 
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be recognised as contingent and somewhat negotiable. While variable in 
extent—behaviour is more readily modified than morphology—none are 
truly transcendent, a priori categories.26 This does not make them 
arbitrary. They determine in advance what is thinkable or doable.27 This is 
not inherently negative, since limits are conditions of possibility: they 
enable. Every action reckons within possibilities organised by contextual 
limits (and implicitly, those limits themselves).28 
Under this aspect, limits are necessary but transformable conditions. 
Under another, they seem fixed and insuperable. Such is the case when 
some state of aﬀairs is naturalised as an enduring object, its constitutive 
processes elided. This occurs routinely with the human. Manifold reasons 
exist to question the universality of generic humanity and normal form 
and function. The human emerges relationally: its apparent harmony 
within the world is not, strictly speaking, spontaneous, but the product of 
co-evolving processes. However, only the outcomes of such activities are 
typically endorsed as real. Developmental processes are taken as 
secondary, even ignored. This takes the product for producer: it places the 
‘ideal human’ prior and external to the circumstances of its elaboration. Its 
purportedly determinate form and function become transcendent norms 
constraining bodies and modes of being within a grid of pregiven 
possibilities. Limit becomes a limitation upon variety, while the body’s 
fundamental and constitutive indetermination is obscured. 
Related implications obtain for freedom and dependence. At least since 
modern thought, the human person has been considered an individual 
                                               
 26   Even organisms are transient determinations of ongoing processes. 
 27  That is, Foucault’s assertion that subjectivity is formed in and through extant epistemic 
regimes antecedent of any individual. Thrown into a preexisting socio-historical context, 
one necessarily draws upon extant codes, behaviours and norms in order to intelligibly 
constitute oneself. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to 
Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1998). Michel Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1995). 
 28  Indeed, a perfectly free or unconditioned act, lacking the limits entailed by initial impetus 
and context, would be groundless. 
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cognising agent, having certain essential attributes, and free—at least in 
principle—from constraint. Rational, individual autonomy is paramount 
among such attributes. Its body, while partially determined, labours to 
realise this freedom.29 This becomes another norm transcending life.30 
Thus, tool use by notionally nondisabled persons appears to merely extend 
preexisting freedom or ability. Prosthetic use by a putatively impaired 
person, however, is called assistive, and thought to enable freedom or 
ability. This distinction is specious, and elides how ‘nondisabled 
autonomy’ is likewise dependent upon, and enabled by, constitutive 
relations. 
3.2. Limits on the Future 
Why this production of oppositional limits within the heterogeneity of 
bodies? Foucault famously cites rationalising Enlightenment goals of 
organised knowledge and administered bodies. Where bodily anomaly 
was hitherto comprehended through myth or religion, medicine now 
performs this role. However, he and others note that its relatively simple 
dichotomies have succumbed to more granular and mobile operations 
called biopolitics.31 These practices address biological capacities and health 
conditions as political problems. They seek to “optimise, and multiply [life 
by] subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations”,32 by 
targeting perturbations in phenomena that manifest at the population 
level: “birth, and mortality… health, life expectancy”.33 The most salient 
                                               
 29  Roberto Esposito, Persons and Things: From the Body's Point of View (London: Polity, 2015). 
 30  Timothy Campbell, "Bios, Immunity, Life: The Thought of Roberto Esposito," in Roberto 
Esposito, Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2008). 
 31  Foucault, History of Sexuality 1. Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", 
October 59 (1992): 3-7. Roberto Esposito, Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy (London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
 32  Foucault, History of Sexuality 1 137. 
 33  Ibid., 139. 
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aspect of this politicisation and “intensification of biological diﬀerence”34 
is the aim to “improve life by eliminating accidents, the random element, 
and deficiencies”.35 That is, biopolitics involves an attempt to master and 
control the human present, and especially future, by rendering these 
“regular, predictable, knowable”.36 Keith Ansell-Pearson and Babette 
Babich each describe such goals as utopian. Instead of life it “as it is, with 
all its trouble and mess”,37 these crave life extirpated of all suﬀering and 
adversity. 38 Imagining the possibility of a future purged of disorder, these 
seek to delimit its outlines in advance. 
This is of utmost importance for anomalous embodiment: it aﬀronts not 
merely by involving ‘hardship’, but by its unpredictability and 
unboundedness. It appears to warrant normalisation by exceeding 
“predictable narratives”.39 In one prevailing imagined future—called by 
Alison Kafer a ‘curative imaginary’—atypical bodies have no place: this 
“understanding of disability… not only expects intervention but also 
cannot imagine… anything other than intervention”.40 This medicalised 
temporality cannot conceive a future not governed by (present) ideals of 
human perfection. Impairment rehabilitated or cured confirms progress; 
as un-cured, it either falls outside or impedes it. This is especially apparent 
in bioethical endorsement of practices like prenatal testing, which take as 
axiomatic that “we” want children who are “longer-lived, stronger, 
                                               
 34  Catherine Mills, Futures of Reproduction: Bioethics and Biopolitics (London: Springer, 2011), 
25. 
 35  Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the College De France, 1974-1975, trans. Graham 
Burchell (London: Verso, 2005), 248. 
 36  Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (London: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 111. 
 37  Babette Babich, "Nietzsche ’s Post-Human Imperative: On the  All-too-Human Dream of 
Transhumanism", The Agonist 4, no. 2 (2011). 
 38  Keith Ansell-Pearson, Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 32-3. 
 39  Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, "The Case for Conserving Disability", Bioethical Inquiry 9, 
no. 3 (2012). 
 40  Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip 27. 
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happier, smarter, fairer”.41 For John Harris this involves prevention of 
inverse attributes, which include atypical properties.42 Thus these appear 
as failure to properly realise an ideal future. Such imagined futures do not 
merely reveal present ideals, but loop back in turn to condition the 
present. 
Concluding Remarks 
Can one aﬃrm biomedical strategies continuing normalisation or 
endorsing a biopolitical future? Arguably yes, alongside conceptual work 
to disclose presuppositions and explore alternatives. I do not argue for or 
against particular procedures, but am concerned where certain outcomes 
seem obvious, or are taken for granted. I am sceptical of practices 
proceeding from abstract type rather than concrete embodiments; from 
individual autonomy rather than interdependence; and especially, claims 
based in restoration of full humanity. While not every mode of living is 
equivalent—some things are experienced as obstacles; bodies do incur 
restrictions—I reject ideal form or function for the absolute singularity of 
bodies, and multiple and diverse modes of living. 
I finish with several gestures towards a more open account. First, 
anomaly has nothing essentially to do with health. Catherine Mills notes 
that for Georges Canguilhem, species typicality illicitly conflates two 
kinds of norm. Anomaly is synchronic, describing similitude and 
diﬀerence among diverse bodies. Its norms are statistical. Pathology is 
diachronic, describing temporal modification of life course: how 
conducive states of aﬀairs are with subjective goals. Its norms are 
therapeutic and evaluative. Anomaly, as statistical deviation, is not 
                                               
 41  John Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People (Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 8. 
 42  For example, the majority of women in developed countries choose abortion following a 
Down syndrome diagnosis. Catherine Mills, "The Case of the Missing Hand: Gender, 
Disability, and Bodily Norms in Selective Termination", Hypatia 30, no. 1 (2014): 82-96. 
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abnormality qua pathology, which involves “direct and concrete feeling of 
suﬀering and impotence, the feeling of life gone wrong”.43 For 
Canguilhem, health involves capacity to respond to milieus. Crucially, this 
is not relative to an absolute ideal—no such type exists—but previous 
states of that life. A bodily state can only be evaluated—can only be 
normal—relative to milieu and life trajectory. If anomaly does not perturb 
life activity, it is normal, not pathological, for that person. This can be 
fruitfully coupled with Anita Silvers diﬀerentiation between functional 
level and mode:44 “mode is the manner in which a functional outcome is 
achieved… level is the quantitative degree of the functional performance, 
such as speed or the strength”.45 For ‘normal function’ advocates it is better 
to approximate normal mode than to function well, precluding 
“anomalous but eﬀectively adaptive alternative modes”.46 If normal 
function is abandoned, high functional levels are realisable for “very 
atypical people” using “atypical modes of functioning”.47 
Second, autonomy criteria require modification. Humans are 
constitutively conditional upon myriad prosthetics. Instead of a binary 
between normal bodies with (potentially) unlimited freedom of activity, 
and abnormal bodies whose activity is intrinsically limited, there are 
heterogeneous bodies within contexts that partially enable them. I reject 
dichotomisation between dependency and autonomy for enablement. This 
                                               
 43  Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 
129. 
 44  This might also comport with Merleau-Ponty’s ‘optimal grip’: an adequate relation to 
desired outcomes in some context. This ‘norm’ is relative neither to other bodies nor an 
abstract ideal, but to realising conditions that, however atypical, avail of one’s ‘flourishing’. 
Cochlear ear implants can be a salient therapeutic provision for some, rather than a 
normalising strategy that disavows Deaf identity. Concurrently, others may reasonably 
reject implants for just that reason.  
 45  Ron Amundson, "Against Normal Function", Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological 
and Biomedical Sciences 31, no. 1 (2000): 33-53. 
 46  Anita Silvers, "A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing: Treating Disabilities as Deviations from 
'Species-Typical' Functioning," in Enhancing Human Capacities: Conceptual Complexities 
and Ethical Implications (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 104. 
 47  Amundson, "Against Normal Function", 48. 
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captures interrelation between each aspect of activity, addressing the role 
of context (enabled by) alongside realisation of action (enabled to). A 
simultaneously richer and more modest autonomy should relinquish the 
will to individual self-mastery, for a relational form encompassing and 
aﬃrming connections with other bodies and technologies. 
Finally, there is the future. That humanity is malleable and emerges with 
situation does not dissolve it outright—it is a profound horizon for life—
but implies that its outlines are not unchangeable. Burgeoning 
biotechnological developments will transform capacities in ways that 
overspill all extant humans, engendering new, yet-inconceivable, 
entanglements and enablements. There is no principled reason to 
diﬀerentiate between biotechnical, or medical and social, interventions. 
Rejection of a normalcy criterion means that proposed interventions need 
not replicate existing functions. They are only limited by what can be 
imagined. And, imagining diﬀerent futures might also allow us to 
diﬀerently imagine, and create, the present. 
 
Written as part of an Irish Research Council Government of Ireland 
Postgraduate Scholarship. 
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